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ABSTRACT
This paper studies high school dropout behavior by estimating the long-run consequences to leaving
school early. I measure these consequences using changes in minimum school leaving ages  n often
introduced to prevent dropping out  n and compare results across the United States, Canada, and
the United Kingdom. Students compelled to stay in school experience substantial gains to lifetime
wealth, health, and other labor market activities for all three countries, and these results hold up
against a wide array of specification checks. I estimate dropping out one year later increases present
value income by more than 10 times forgone earnings and more than 2 times the maximum lifetime
annual wage. The one-year cost to attending high school would have to be extremely large to offset
these gains under a model that views education as an investment. Other, sub-optimal, explanations
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  A common approach to explain why some students finish school earlier than others treats 
education as an investment.  Students invest time, forgo earnings, and endure stress to attend school, but 
only if anticipated gains from doing so are large enough to offset these costs.  For high school students, an 
investment decision involves weighing expected rewards from obtaining a degree to effort required in 
getting it.  Those that dropout drop out because they detest school, lack motivation, or anticipate little 
reward from graduation [Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999].  But whatever the reason, viewing education as an 
investment presupposes dropouts choose what’s best for them under the circumstances.  
While an investment model of school choice considers a dropout decision ex ante optimal, many 
view such an event as unfortunate.  Many policymakers, educators, and researchers (and parents) feel that 
individual decisions to leave secondary school before graduation lead to sub-optimal lifetime outcomes.  
This view is no more apparent than from the motivation behind wanting to introduce, maintain, or update 
compulsory school laws.  Such laws have been around for more than a hundred years, and continue to 
exist in virtually every industrialized country.  Motivation for introducing them, or for updating them, 
often relates to assumptions that children who would have left school earlier are, in fact, better off from 
staying on.
1  Viewing education as investment leads to exactly opposite conclusions.  In the absence of 
positive externalities, compulsory schooling restricts choice and should lower welfare among individuals 
wanting to leave sooner [e.g. Wolf, 2002, Rickenbacker, 1974, Gatto, 2002, Machan, 2000].
2 
This paper is the first to estimate lifetime opportunity costs from leaving high school using 
changes in compulsory school laws.  Quantifying the overall consequences from dropping out offers 
                                                 
1  In North Carolina, for example, the State Superintendent wants to raise the minimum school-leaving age from 16 
to 18, an age, he says, “that better reflects the maturity required to make such an important and life-changing 
decision” [http://www.ncpublicschools.org/news/01-02/020502.html].  Thomas Upson, a Connecticut Senator 
expressed similar arguments: “Too many people regret the reckless decisions they made when they were 16 and 
decided to drop out.  Our goal is to try to prevent that” [http://home.comcast.net/~majerus-collins/dropout.htm]. 
2  While not advocating support for or against compulsory schooling, Chiswick (1969) notes, ‘while those compelled 
to over-invest [in school] experience an increase in their annual post-investment income, they experience a decrease 
in their marginal and average internal rates of return”.  2
important perspective for evaluating theories of school attainment.  Knowing what dropouts give up is 
essential for understanding why they do it.  If rewards to high school are particularly high, such findings 
could indicate families of school leavers are financially constrained or that the psychological costs from 
attending are extremely high.  But if additional evidence suggested these explanations were unlikely, such 
findings could also suggest other reasons for leaving school – cultural or peer influences may 
predominate adolescent decision-making, youths may underestimate the rewards from staying in school 
or ignore future consequences of their decisions.   
Minimum school-leaving laws are ideal instruments for measuring forgone benefits from leaving 
school because they identify gains for would-be-dropouts without changing incentives or costs.  If the 
instruments are valid, we can estimate counterfactual gains from additional school for students that would 
otherwise have left sooner.  Several previous papers estimate causal effects of education using 
compulsory school laws as instruments and find strikingly similar results.  But none of these papers use 
their results to discuss implications for explaining dropout outcomes.  Angrist and Krueger (1991) use 
differences in school-entry laws to identify students dropping out with less education because they were 
born just after the entry cut-off date as opposed to just prior.  Students that finished their schooling with a 
year less of class because of these laws experienced on average 9.2 percent lower adult earnings than 
those dropping out later.  Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) use differences in school-leaving laws across the 
United States and over time to identify adults made to stay in school for different periods before having 
the option to drop out.  Students compelled to take an extra year experienced an average increase of 10.3 
percent in adult earnings.  Harmon and Walker (1995), examine the effect on earnings from changes in 
minimum school-leaving ages in the United Kingdom.  They estimate adult earnings rose an average of 
15.3 percent for each additional year of school a student had to take.   
Other studies examine non-pecuniary outcomes.  Lochner and Moretti (2003) find school 
compulsion lowers the likelihood of committing crime or ending up in jail.  And Lleras-Muney (2001)  3
uses compulsory attendance laws to examine the effect of education on mortality.  She estimates an 
additional year of education substantially lowers the probability of dying among elderly people.   
We cannot begin to discuss these results without first establishing their sensitivity and credibility.  
It is important to establish that changes in curriculum or economic conditions were not the main reasons 
underlying subsequent changes in education attainment and outcomes.  Several earlier studies assess the 
effectiveness of compulsory school laws on education attainment, including Schmidt (1995), Lleras-
Muney (2002), Lochner and Moretti (2003) and Goldin and Katz (2003).  Lochner and Moretti and 
Lleras-Muney examine extensively whether changes in compulsory school laws simply reflect underlying 
region-specific trends in school attainment.  Both conclude school attendance laws raise attainment and 
not the other way around.   
To address these issues further, I demonstrate consistency across countries in finding similar 
effects of compulsory schooling for the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.  The cross-
country comparison provides an opportunity to examine estimates under very different circumstances, 
different institutions, and for different time periods.  The large datasets available and the nature of these 
policies also allow for several robustness analyses.  I also show graphically the discontinuity in education 
attainment and earnings for adults that entered high school just before or just after an increase in the 
school leaving age. 
The main findings suggest one year of compulsory schooling raises subsequent annual earnings 
by 10 to 14 percent for youths from all three countries (similar to previous studies).  I also find large gains 
to health, chances of employment, and other labor market activities.  Using the pecuniary results and 
predicted wage profiles, I estimate one additional year of high school raises present value earnings by 
about 2 to 3 times a dropout’s maximum lifetime annual wage.  These results hold remarkably well 
against a wide array of specification checks.  Whether or not the possibility of non-pecuniary benefits 
from education are taken into account, the main conclusion of this paper is that the one year cost to attend 
school would have to be extremely large to offset these gains, under the education investment model.  I  4
offer alternative explanations that could rationalize compulsory schooling policies.  These include 
temporarily high discount rates, underestimating expected gains, and social pressures that predominate 
adolescent concerns.      
Next section describes the paper’s methodology.  Section III presents the paper’s cross-country 
data and describes the school leaving laws used for the U.S., Canada, and the U.K.  Section IV shows the 
estimated impact these laws had on overall education attainment and examines the robustness of these 
findings.  Section V presents the main results.  Section VI discusses what the results suggest about 




The main regression model analyzes how school leaving laws affect subsequent outcomes – 
earnings in particular.  Since changes in these laws vary by region (state, province, Britain/N.Ireland) and 
time, not at the individual level, all initial data extracts, with individual observations, are first aggregated 
into cell means.  This procedure explicitly removes within region heterogeneity and reduces computation 
time substantially.  When the sample includes both males and females, the data are also categorized into 
cells by gender.  The U.S. sample also groups cells by race.   
Define  jkl y  as the average outcome for members among birth cohort  j , from high school region 
k , and surveyed in year l.  The equation of interest (weighted by cell group population size) is: 
 
(1)  jkl l k j jkl jkl jkl e e e e X S y + + + + + = β δ , 
 
where  jkl S  is the average education attainment for members among birth cohort  j , from high school 
region k , and surveyed in year l,  jkl X  includes additional birth cohort, region, and survey year controls,  5
j e ,  k e , and  l e  represent fixed effects for birth cohort, region, and survey year respectively, and  jkl e  
represents the statistical residual.  All regressions in the paper compute robust standard error estimates 
using Huber-White correction methods, clustering by region and birth cohort.  In addition to region 
specific controls for economic and demographic conditions at the time birth cohorts were age 14,  jkl X  
includes quartic age controls for each birth cohort (from different survey years) to estimate age-earnings 
profiles.   Multiple years of cross-sectional data allow for simultaneous age, birth cohort, and survey year 
effects by assuming two birth cohort effects are the same.  Alternative age effects, or dropping the age 
controls all together does not affect estimates of δ  by very much.  
The underlying first stage of the instrumental variable regression is: 
 
(2)   jkl l k j jkl jk jkl v v v v X S + + + + + = α γ ,  
 
where  jk γ  is the minimum school leaving age faced by birth cohort  j  from high school region k ,   j v , 
k v , and  l v  are fixed effects for birth cohort, region, and survey year respectively, and  jkl v  represents the 
statistical residual.  Equation (2) uses more than time discontinuities to identify the effects from school-
leaving laws.  Time trends in the outcome variable are controlled for with birth cohort and region fixed 
effects.  Identifying the effects from school-leaving laws comes from differences in the timing of these 
laws across regions.  The analysis is therefore similar to difference-in-difference estimation, but with 
more than one intervention and more than one treatment group.  The schooling effect, δ , is not identified 
if unobserved region specific factors that affect the outcome variable also change at the same time school 
leaving laws change.  Several specification checks are carried out to examine this possibility. 




This section provides an overview of the micro datasets and school leaving laws used in this study.  
Wherever possible, I tried to maintain consistency in sample selection, school laws, and variable 
definitions across all three countries.  The main analysis focuses on all 25 to 64 year old males and 
females who were aged 14 in the years that the school leaving ages were available.   
 
A. The United States 
 
Most of the U.S. analysis uses an extract of native-born individuals aged 25 to 64 from the six 
decennial Census microdata samples between 1950 and 2000.
4  All Censuses contained individual wages, 
poverty status and labor force participation, but only the 1990 and 2000 datasets contained disability 
outcome measures.  The initial sample size among those with positive wages was 2,814,203.  After 
collapsing into cell means, there were 29,804 cells by state, birth cohort, census year, and gender, and 
15,003 cells among males.  Hawaii and Alaskan born respondents were excluded.   
  I coded the schooling variable for individuals in the 1950 to 1980 data as highest grade 
completed, capped at 17 to impose a uniform topcode across censuses.  Following Acemoglu and Angrist 
(2000), average years of schooling were assigned to categorical values in the 1990 and 2000 Censuses 
using the imputation for males and females in Park (1994).  The earnings variable, log weekly wage, was 
calculated by dividing annual wage and salary income by weeks worked, and taking logs. 
                                                 
3The STATA codes for generating the U.S. extracts and results are available on my web site.  The U.S. Censuses are 
available through the Minnesota Population Center [http://www.ipums.umn.edu/usa/].  The U.K. data are available 
through UK Data Archive [http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/].  The Canadian Census data used for this paper are not 
available outside Statistics Canada.  However, while the precision was smaller, I found little difference in the results 
when working with the Public Use Microdata files.  These data are available through Statistics Canada 
[http://www.statcan.ca].   
4  The specific datasets used were the 1950 General 1/330 sample (limited to those with long-form responses), the 
1960 General 1 percent sample, the 1970 Form 2 State 1 percent sample, the 1980 Metro 1 percent sample, the 1990 
1 percent unweighted sample, and the 2000 1 percent unweighted random sample.    7
  The cell groups were assigned a minimum school leaving age according to the year a birth cohort 
was 14 years old and the state they were born.
5  Figure 1 shows the school leaving ages, enacted between 
1915 and 1975, used for the U.S. analysis.  I measured each school leaving age as the minimum between 
a state’s legislated dropout age and the minimum age required to obtain a working permit.
6  A few states 
during this period had no laws in place.  I grouped the 2.2 percent of the sample that faced school-leaving 
ages less than 14 into one category (school leaving age < 14).  All others faced dropout ages of 14, 15, or 
16.  The laws changed frequently over this period, both across states and within states over time.  About 
one-third of the variation in the school leaving age is across-states and two-thirds from within.  Not all 
changes were positive. 
I also generated control variables for state economic and demographic conditions in the year the 
laws were in place.  For each Census between 1910 and 1980, I calculated the fraction of the population 
in each state living in an urban city, the fraction living on a farm, black, in the labor force, in the 




The data extract for Canada comes from the 33 percent sample of the 1971 Census, and the five 
20 percent samples of the 1981 to 2001 censuses.
7  The main extract contained 25 to 64 year olds, born in 
a Canadian province, who were 14 years old between 1925 and 1975.  While provincially legislated 
school leaving ages were available for a wider range of years, I chose this span because the cohorts aged 
                                                 
5  The analysis assumes that Americans went to school in their state of birth, Canadians went to school in their 
province of birth, British born residents went to school in Britain, and Northern Irish residents went to school in 
Norethen Ireland.  Some individuals will be mismatched.  If mobility across regions is unrelated with law changes, 
this measurement error will not bias our estimates.  Lleras-Muney (2001) concludes this seems to be the case for the 
U.S. 
6  Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Lleras-Muney (2001) and Goldin and Katz (2003) find working permit restrictions 
were often more binding than school leaving age restrictions.  The results are not sensitive to using just the dropout 
age as the compulsory school law variable, or the predicted mandatory number of school years, used by Acemoglu 
and Angrist and Lochner and Moretti (2003). 
7 The 1976 Census excludes earnings information and was omitted.    8
14 before 1925 were older than 55 in the 1971 census, and compulsory school laws were often minimally 
enforced at the beginning of the century.  The initial sample size among those with positive wages was 
enormous: 8,208,030.  After collapsing into province, birth cohort, gender, and census groups, the cell 
sample size was 4,120 among males and females, and 2,060 among males.   
The education variable used for the Canadian analysis was highest grade attained in a primary or 
secondary school.  This measure was asked in addition to highest degree completed.  An individual could 
report attaining less than 12 years of high school while still graduating from college or university.   A 
complication with this measure arises because some provinces offered a senior matriculation year with 
Grade 13 and some provinces allowed graduation in high school after Grade 11.  I therefore top-coded the 
grade attainment measure to 11.  This recoding did not affect the ability to identify would-be-dropouts 
compelled to take additional schooling.  Dropouts that entered school at age 6 and advanced a grade every 
year were still able to leave school before Grade 12.
8  I used the log of annual wages and salaries as the 
earnings variable for the Canadian data.  I did not convert this variable to weekly earnings because a 
considerable number of full time workers excluded their paid vacations or sick leave when reporting 
number of weeks last year worked, contrary to Census instructions. 
Figure 2 displays the minimum school leaving ages legislated by province, between 1925 and 
1975.  These laws were compiled directly from provincial Statues and Revised Statutes containing the 
Acts of legislation and amendments since inception.  In a previous study, I documented the history of 
these changes and other compulsory school laws extensively [Oreopoulos, 2003b].  A few provinces in 
the first half of the century legislated different dropout ages depending on whether youths attended 
schools in urban or rural areas.  For these cases I recorded the dropout age as that for rural areas, since 
most often that period, the majority of residents lived in rural areas.  All provinces except British 
Columbia experienced legislated increases.  Working permit exceptions below the school leaving age 
                                                 
8  See Oreopoulos (2003b) for alternative assumptions to this variable, and alternative choices for the education 
attainment variable.  In general I find, while this topcoding generates the most precise estimates, alternative coding 
does not change the main findings.  9
were rarely applied.  Less than 12 percent of the sample faced a school leaving age of 16.  I chose to 
group individuals facing a school leaving age of either 15 or 16, since the effect on grade attainment from 
raising the school leaving age to 16 from 15 was not significantly different from zero but was imprecisely 
measured.  Including an indicator for facing a school leaving age equal to 16 did not alter the second stage 
estimates.   
Similar to the U.S. extract, I also generated control variables for provincial economic and 
demographic conditions using historical Census tabulations and linear interpolation.  I calculated control 
variables for the fraction of the population in each province in urban areas, in the manufacturing sector, 
female, and the average age. 
 
C. The United Kingdom 
 
The U.K. analysis combines 15 U.K. General Household Surveys (GHHS), from 1983 to 1998 
(the 1997 GHS was cancelled), to 14 Northern Ireland Continuous Household Surveys, from 1985 to 
1998.  I refer to both as General Household Surveys, since both questionnaires were almost identical.  The 
major difference was that earnings from the UK GHHS were coded exactly, while earnings from the 
Northern Ireland GHSS were coded by category.  Average earnings were assigned for Northern Irish 
individuals within grouped earnings categories.  An advantage of the UK data is that education is 
recorded as the age an individual completed full time education.  This measure corresponds exactly with 
the school leaving age laws.  The U.S. and Canadian measures of education record grade attained or 
completed, and miss the full effect of compulsory schooling when high school students remain longer in 
school from these laws, but do not advance a grade.  The combined dataset contains 65,098 individuals 
aged 32 to 64, who were 14 between 1935 and 1965 (the data only go back to 1983, so we cannot use 
respondents younger than 32 for this analysis).  The data include British born adults and all extracted 
respondents from the Northern Ireland surveys because foreign-born were not identified.  The data were  10
aggregated into cell groups by survey year, gender, birth cohort, and region (Britain or Ireland).  The 
remaining number of cells was 1,492, and half this for males.   
There were only 2 changes to the school leaving age in Britain and Northern Ireland between 
1935 and 1965, but they were both remarkably effective and influential.  Legislation from Great Britain’s 
1944 Education Act led the school leaving age in England, Scotland, and Wales to rise in 1947 from 14 to 
15 years.
9  Figure 3A displays the effect this legislative change had on early school-leavers.  Before 1947, 
a very high fraction of children left full-time school at age 14 (or less).  Over just three years however – 
between 1945 and 1948 – the portion of 14 year-olds leaving schools falls from about 57 percent to less 
than 10 percent.
10  The ability to accommodate the massive rise in enrolment was possible through a 
concerted, almost military-like, national operation that expanded the supply of teachers, buildings, and 
furniture within the three-year span.  The 1947 change seems to have little effect on the fraction of 
children dropping out at age 15 or less – it appears virtually everyone that would have left school at age 
14, left at age 15 after the change.
 11    
  The 1947 Education Act in Northern Ireland was closely modeled on the British one.  The rise in 
the school-leaving age, from 14 to 15, however, was not implemented until 1957 due to political 
stonewalling.  Figure 3B charts the proportion of youths aged 14 dropping out, and the proportion 
                                                 
9 For a more detailed analysis of the history of British education and the 1944 Education Act in particular, see 
Halsey, Heath and Ridge (1980).  The authors argue, “the 1944 Act put a legislative stamp on forty years of progress 
towards separate, competitive, and free secondary education for all”.  Although other reforms were included in the 
Act, the changing of the school-leaving age in 1947 had, by far, the most sudden and influential impact on students. 
10 The finding that some adults reported finishing school at age 14, even after the school-leaving age had changed, 
likely reflects measurement error, noncompliance, or delayed enforcement.  
11 The term ‘dropout’ is something of a misnomer in the UK, since the those that failed to advance to secondary 
school were expected to leave at the earliest opportunity.  For those wanting to advance in school beyond age 14 
prior to 1947, the process typically involved moving from elementary to secondary school at age 12.  Elementary 
schools offered education past age 11, but usually students that stayed did so until reaching age 14.  Pupils 
transferred to secondary school at age 11, at no cost, on the basis of competitive examinations.  The proportion of 
free places began in 1907 at 25 percent of total attendance, and rose to more than 50 percent by 1931.  The other half 
entered by paying fees that were subsidized more than two-thirds by the state.  The 1944 Education Act removed 
these fees, in addition to making the first year of secondary school compulsory.  For a discussion of the history of 
British and Irish education over the period of analysis, see Halsey at al. [1980], Barnard [1961], Dent [1954, 1957, 
1970, 1971], Gosden [1969] and Durcan [1972].  I shall occasionally refer to UK school leavers as dropouts for 
convenience.  11
dropping out at 15 or less.  A clear break occurs for the portion of early school-leavers in 1957.  The 
influence on school attainment from the change in the school-leaving age is clearly visible.
12 
 
IV. The Effect of School-Leaving Laws on School Attainment 
   
  Table 1 presents the first-stage effects of the school leaving age changes on education attainment, 
specified as in equation (2), and the corresponding reduced form effects of the school leaving age on 
earnings.  The estimates for the U.S. are listed first.  Recall that the data are initially aggregated into cell 
means and weighted by population size.  All regressions include fixed effects for birth year, region, 
survey year, gender, race, and a quartic in age, and additional regional demographic and economic 
controls according to when cohorts were aged 14. 
    Column 1 shows a monotonic relationship in the effect from raising the school leaving age on 
the total number of years of completed schooling.  For the full sample, years of schooling is .24 years 
higher for those that faced a dropout age of 14 compared to those that faced a smaller dropout age, or 
none at all.  Average school attainment increases by .023 years from raising the dropout age to 15, and 
another .20 years from raising it to 16 (no state in the period examined enforced a dropout age higher than 
16).  We can easily reject that the coefficients on the laws are zero, with an F-statistic of 87.8.
13  Column 
2 shows similar estimated effects if we restrict the sample to only those with less than 12 years of 
completed schooling (and then collapse the data into cell means).  Focussing on this sample zeros in on 
the individuals most likely to be affected by the dropout age changes.  The estimated effects from facing 
                                                 
12 An earlier version of this paper [Oreopoulos, 2003a] includes the change in the school leaving age from 15 to 16 
in 1973 for both Britain and Northern Ireland.  Since the change occurred at the same time for both Britain and 
Northern Ireland, this paper’s methodology cannot identify the impact from the change.  The previous analysis 
included data from the Republic of Ireland, whose minimum school leaving age changed once, from 14 to 15 in 
1972.  The Eurobarometer surveys contain data for these three regions, and categorical family household income 
data.  Using these surveys, I estimate returns to compulsory schooling using the 5 school leaving age changes and 
find similar results compared to those presented here.   
13 The R
2 for this regression that uses population weighted cell means is .9258, and .9242 if we leave out the dropout 
age indicators.  12
different dropout ages when young are about the same, as we would expect if those compelled to take 
additional schooling from changes in these laws still dropped out, but dropped out later.
14 
  Compulsory school laws affect those intending to leave high school at early grades.  If changes to 
these laws do not cause students to attain post-secondary schooling, the estimated effects of facing 
different dropout ages among those with at least some post-secondary schooling should be zero.
15  If other 
state specific policies or economic conditions improved at the same time dropout ages increased, we 
might expect the dropout age changes to correlate with education attainment among the post-secondary 
school sample.  Column 3 shows this is not the case.  For the sample with more than 12 years of 
schooling, none of the dropout ages are related to their education attainment.   
  The last three columns show the reduced form estimates for the effects of these dropout ages on 
log weekly earnings.  The main purpose of showing these results is to demonstrate that changes in the 
dropout ages do not affect earnings among the post-secondary sample.  Just as we should not expect these 
laws to impact post secondary schooling attainment, we should not expect these laws to affect outcome 
variables for the higher educated sample.  If we did observe this, we might concern that other factors that 
affected both dropouts and graduates underlie the correlations in Table 1.  While the laws are strongly 
related to earnings among dropouts, Column 6 shows no noticeable relationship between dropout ages 
faced when young and earnings for the post-secondary school sample.  I also interpret these results as 
suggesting no state-specific externalities from raising high school education attainment on the same birth 
cohorts that attained post secondary school.   
  Table 1 also presents parallel results for Canada.  The results are similar to those from the U.S 
extract.  High school grade attainment is .41 grades higher, on average, for those that faced a dropout age 
                                                 
14 The results also suggest changes in U.S. school-leaving laws influenced would-be dropouts to graduate.  If we 
restrict the initial sample to those with 12 or less years of completed schooling, the findings are very similar to those 
from using the full-sample. 
15 Lang and Kropp (1986) suggest that individuals intending to complete one or two additional years of schooling 
after the minimum age required may obtain additional education after the dropout age is changed to avoid signalling 
to employers they are in the same category as those who leave school at soon as possible.  If this influence caused a 
significant number to obtain post-secondary schooling, we might expect the coefficients to be positive.     
  13
of 14, compared to those that faced a lower age limit.  Grade attainment is .23 years higher on top of that, 
for the group of Canadian youths that faced a dropout age of 15 or 16.  Again, we easily reject the 
coefficients on the school leaving law indicators are zero.  Column 2 shows very similar point estimates 
for the dropout age effects after restricting the same to only those that attained less than 12th Grade.  
Virtually everyone in the sample that attained some post secondary schooling reported attaining Grade 11 
or more.  To examine whether dropout age changes in Canada affected higher levels of education, I used a 
different school attainment variable since the one used in the first two columns, grade attained, only goes 
up to great 12.  The dependent variable in column 3 for the Canadian data is an indicator for post 
secondary schooling.  Similar to the U.S. results, I find no evidence that changes in dropout ages in 
Canada affected post secondary education attainment among the sample that completed Grade 11 or 
more.  The reduced form results from the Canadian extract in columns 4 to 6 also show no effect from 
dropout age changes on annual wages among the higher educated sample. 
  The increase in the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15 in Britain and in Northern Ireland 
has the largest estimated effect on education attainment.  This is not surprising, considering the striking 
discontinuities in figures 3A and 3B.  Raising the school leaving age from 14 to 15 increased the average 
age students left full-time school by more than half a year for the sample that left when less than 17 years 
old.  The F-statistic for rejecting that the coefficient for the higher dropout age is zero is 358.5, for the 
early school leaver sample.  I find no significant evidence that the higher school leaving age affected 
those that left school at age 18 or more.  Raising the school leaving age to 15 increased annual wages 
overall by about 5.1 percent among early high school leavers, but had no discernable impact on wages for 
more educated workers. 
To further address the concern that region-specific trends underlie the dropout age and education 
relationship, I present evidence that future dropout age changes do not correlate with current dropout 
decisions.  In Table 2, I follow Lleras-Muney (2002) in matching individuals to future school leaving 
ages, based on their region of birth and year when aged 14.  Columns 1 and 2 show the results from  14
regressing education attainment on a birth cohort’s own dropout age faced at age 14, and the dropout age 
that later birth cohorts one or two years after.  Each row of these two columns shows results from separate 
regressions.
16  The same state/cohort/time fixed effects and controls used for last table’s analysis are 
included here.   
For Canada and the U.S., the current school leaving age significantly affects education 
attainment, while future school leaving ages have small or no effects.  For the U.K., an immediate future 
change to the dropout age is negatively related with school attainment.  Those in high school in Britain 
just before the 1947 increase in the school leaving age and those in Northern Ireland just before the 1957 
change were more likely to leave school early relative to other birth cohorts.  I have little explanation for 
this finding, but the negative relationship is opposite to what we would have expected if other factors 
around the time of the law change affected education attainment.  The finding only reinforces the U.K. 
results.
17   
We can carry out the same validity tests using earnings as the outcome variable instead of 
education attainment.  We should not expect future dropout age changes to affect earlier dropouts’ 
earnings, except if raising overall education attainment leads to positive externalities for everyone.   
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show the regressions of log earnings on current and future dropout ages, plus 
the usual fixed effects and regional controls.  In every case, the reduced for effects of a cohorts’ own 
dropout age affects their earnings.  We also observe zero or small effects on earnings from future dropout 
ages.  Such findings indicate no evidence that the first-stage or reduced-form results are chiefly driven by 
other immediate factors.  
Another way to control for conditions surrounding the law changes is to include upcoming 
dropout ages as control variables themselves.   The first row in column 5 shows the U.S. return to 
                                                 
16 These regressions use a single variable for the dropout age instead of the indicator variables used for Table 1 and 
for the main results in Section V.  Cohorts that faced a dropout age less than 14 were assigned a value of 13 for both 
the U.S. and Canadian samples.   
17 The coefficients become insignificant and close to zero when using a wider sample of birth cohorts, aged 14 
between 1935 and 1985 instead of the sample between 1935 and 1965.  15
compulsory schooling estimate from regressing log weekly earnings on schooling, fixed effects for year 
of birth, state, Census year, gender, race, a quartic in age, and control variables for fraction of state living 
in urban areas, fraction black, in the labor force, in the manufacturing sector, female, and average age 
based on when a birth cohort was aged 14.  Schooling is instrumented by a single variable for a cohort’s 
own dropout age.  I estimate an additional year of compulsory schooling raises earnings by about 15.1 
percent.  Rows 2 and 3 show how this estimate changes when adding controls for upcoming dropout 
changes.  The point estimate falls slightly with the inclusion of this control, but not by any significant 
amount.  The inclusion of upcoming dropout age changes while facing a dropout decision also has little 
effect on overall estimates of compulsory schooling for Canada and the U.K. 
Figure 3 demonstrates graphically the discontinuity in average education attainment and earnings 
at the time of a law change.  Each panel shows estimates of coefficients on lead and lag indicators for 
whether compulsory schooling increases.  I selected the high school dropout samples for each country and 
aggregated the data by region and birth cohort groups.  The dependent variables are schooling and log 
earnings.  Lags include years –12 to –3.  Leads include years +3 to +12.  The regression also includes 
region and birth cohort controls fixed effects. 
Figure 3 shows clearly identification of the effects of compulsory school laws comes from 
changes to education attainment and earnings immediately or soon after school leaving age changes and 
not before.  In Panel A, average years of completed schooling and average log weekly earnings among 
U.S. cohorts show no noticeable trend leading up to the dropout age increase.  Between cohorts 3 years 
before and 3 years after an increase, average years of completed schooling rises .150 years.  Log weekly 
earnings rises over the same period by .025 points.  If we divide the earnings increase by the schoolings 
increase, we arrive at a return to compulsory schooling estimate of 16.7 percent, which is not much higher 
than the full-sample estimates displayed below.   
Earnings increases appear to occur more gradually for birth cohorts exposed to more restrictive 
compulsory school laws.  Such results could indicate adjustment costs for cohorts compelled to stay in  16
school immediately after a change, or that legislated changes took some time to become fully enforced.  
Even as education attainment subsequently rises after a law change, earnings also subsequently rises.  The 
graphs show earnings and education moving roughly in tandem immediately following a law increase, 
and after controlling for region and year of birth.  The figures are important because they suggest that 
dropout age increases raise education attainment and subsequent earnings, and not that they simply 
respond to underlying trends in schooling. 
To summarize, the findings indicate no evidence that the first-stage and reduced-form results are 
chiefly driven by factors other than a causal effect from compulsory schooling.  For all three countries, I 
estimate strong effects on education attainment from raising the minimum school leaving age on a sample 
of high school dropouts, and virtually no effect on a sample with post secondary schooling.  I find little 
influence that changes in dropout ages to later birth cohorts impacted education attainment for earlier 
cohorts.  Plotting education attainment and earnings by cohorts exposed to more or less restrictive school 
laws shows a clear discontinuity in attainment at the time laws increased. 
 




Instrumental variable estimates of equation (1) with log earnings as the outcome variable are 
shown in Table 3.  All regressions include fixed effects for birth cohort, region, survey year, gender, and a 
quartic in age.  The U.S. results also include a dummy variable for race and state controls for fraction of 
state living in urban areas, fraction black, in the labor force, in the manufacturing sector, female, and 
average age based on when a birth cohort was age 14.  Similar province controls for Canada include 
fraction in urban areas, fraction in the manufacturing sector, female, and average age.  Data are grouped 
into means by birth year, region, gender, race (for the U.S.) and survey year.  Huber-White standard  17
errors are shown from clustering by region and birth cohort.  Column 2 shows these estimates for the full 
country samples.  Column 3 shows the results using only individuals with less than post-secondary 
schooling.  Column 1 shows corresponding least squares (OLS) estimates using data grouped into means 
by education attainment, birth year, region, gender, race, and survey year. 
  I estimate that dropouts compelled to take an additional year of high school earn about 10 to 14 
percent more than dropouts without the additional year.  The returns to compulsory schooling estimates 
are remarkably consistent across all countries, whether restricting the initial sample by gender or race (for 
the U.S.).  The estimates from the smaller sample of high school dropouts vary little from the full sample, 
as we would expect if compulsory school laws have minimum impact on enrolment beyond high school 
and on outcomes of those with post secondary schooling.  The U.S. and Canadian results are measured 
precisely, with standard errors between .01 and .02, while the U.K. results have wider confidence regions 
around similar point estimates (ranging from .073 to .158).  The IV estimates try to identify gains from 
schooling among dropouts wanting to leave earlier, whereas the OLS estimates include possibly 
heterogeneous gains from schooling at different levels and among individuals with different family 
background and circumstances.
18  I restricted the OLS estimates to the high school sample in order to 
narrow the heterogeneity among groups identified in the OLS and IV results.  The OLS estimates of the 
gains to schooling are similar for the Canadian and U.K. samples, but lower for the U.S. sample – a 
common finding from previous studies using compulsory school law instruments.  I view these results to 
suggest the marginal gains from schooling among individuals wanting to leave school as soon as possible 
may be higher relative to the marginal gains for other early school leavers. 
    
B. Health, Employment, and Poverty 
 
                                                 
18 Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) (and others) point out an instrumental variables approach identifies only the 
average treatment effect for the group impacted by the instrument.  18
The results in Table 4 show other effects from compulsory schooling.  Health outcomes are 
strongly associated from the minimum school-leaving age changes, corroborating with Lleras-Muney’s 
(2002) finding that schooling lowers mortality.  The 1990 and 2000 U.S. Censuses ask questions about 
physical and mental health limitations.  Among all individuals in the sample aged 25 to 74, 9.2 percent 
claim a physical or mental health disability that limits personal care.  I estimate an additional year of 
compulsory schooling lowers the likelihood of reporting such disability by 1.7 percentage points, similar 
to the OLS estimate.  A year of compulsory schooling also lowers the likelihood of reporting a disability 
that limits daily activity by 2.5 percentage points.  For the U.K., the GHHS questionnaire asks 
respondents to self report whether they are in good, fair, or poor health.  A one-year increase in schooling 
lowers the probability of reporting being in poor health by 3.2 percentage points, and raises the chances of 
reporting being in good health by 6.0 percentage points.   
Schooling also affects many labor market outcomes in addition to earnings.  In all three countries, 
I find compulsory schooling lowers the likelihood of respondents being in the labor force and looking for 
work.  The magnitude of the effect is similar across countries, and similar compared to corresponding 
OLS estimates.  Compulsory schooling also lowers the likelihood of receiving welfare and being 
classified as poor.  Dropouts that drop out one year later are 6 percentage points less likely to fall below 
the U.S. Poverty Line and 3 percentage points less likely to fall below Canada’s Low-Income-Cut-Off.
19 
      
C. Present Value Gains From Dropping Out One Year Later 
 
To predict present value financial gains from an extra year of compulsory high school, I re-
estimate equation (1) using the samples of male dropouts for each country and include respondents aged 
15 to 64 to help predict the shape of a dropout’s wage profile over his entire working period.  Figure 5 
                                                 
19 A household falls below the Low Income Cut-off if they spend more than 20 percentage points above the average 
comparative household on food, clothing, and shelter.    19
shows projected earnings of 15 and 16 year old dropouts for each country using quartic age coefficients, 
returns to compulsory schooling estimates, and a baseline wage of $7,525 for 15 year old dropouts at age 
15 (the average wage among 17 year old male dropouts working 50 hours or more in the 2000 U.S. 
Census).
20  It makes no difference what starting wage we choose as the base for calculating the annual 
values, as long as we compare present value gains relative to the wage profiles used to calculate them 
(e.g. the maximum or initial wage).   
The profiles take the usual shape, rising initially with age, levelling off around 40, and falling at 
late ages.  They exclude initial earnings year for 15 year-old dropouts.  I consider this amount later when 
discussing foregone earnings.  For the U.S., a male dropout that left school at age 16 earns 15.4 percent 
more, each year, on average, compared to a dropout that left school at age 15.  The corresponding gains 
for male dropouts in Canada and the U.K. are 12.9 percent and 13.7 percent respectively.  Note that the 
shape of the profiles does not depend crucially on the underlying initial choice of country, earnings 
measure, starting age, or education attainment sample (everyone or everyone with less than high school).  
The shape also does not depend on assuming a constant returns to compulsory schooling over the profile.   
Table 5 converts the annual earnings differences for each country to present value (to age 15), 
using discount rates of 3, 5, and 7 percent.  The appropriate rate, discussed more below, depends on 
relative risk assumptions.  If dropping out a year later increases expected earnings but also increases the 
probability of ending up with particularly low wages, we may want to consider higher discount factors 
above the risk-free rate.  If dropping out later improves the chances of always doing no worse than before 
                                                 
20 In order to estimate wage profiles for earlier ages in the U.K., I widen the sample to those 14 between 1935 
and 1985, and include an indicator for whether a cohort faced a dropout age of 16 after the change in 
Britain and Northern Ireland in 1973.  To identify the effects of this change, I drop the birth cohort fixed 
effects from the instrumental variable regression and include only a quartic in age, a Northern Ireland 
indicator, and fixed effects for survey year.  Many multiple survey years help reduce average birth cohort 
trend effects, but cannot remove them with certainty as with the other previous regressions.  Finding 
similar results, however, shows the U.K. results are not determined by diverging earnings and education 
trends in Britain and Northern Ireland.  Harmon and Walker (1995) use this approach to estimates returns 
to compulsory schooling in Britain.  Results are similar working only with the more accurate British 
earnings data.  20
(so that the wage distribution for 16 year-old dropouts stochastically dominates the distribution for 15 
year-old dropouts), the appropriate rate to use for discounting is, at most, the risk-free rate.  With an 
annual log earnings gain of .154 for the U.S. projections, Column 1 shows the average present value gain 
from dropping out a year letter is $103,593 under a 3 percent discount rate.  That amount exceeds 
foregone earnings by a factor of 13.8 and peak annual lifetime wages by a factor of 3.0.  If foregone 
earnings were the only costs incurred while attending school, the implicit rate of return from the 
additional year would be 29.5 percent. 
The comparisons do not change much with alternative discount rates or annual rates of return 
from compulsory schooling.  Even with a 7 percent discount rate, the PV gain in Column 1 exceeds 
forgone earnings by 6.4 and peak annual wages by 1.4.  Supposing that the individual annual earnings 
gains are lower, at 7 percent, PV earnings are still 4.0 times foregone earnings and almost the same as one 
year of peak annual wages under a 5 percent discount rate.  Results for Canada and the U.K. are very 




A. Compulsory School Laws Should Go 
 
One way to frame the discussion in interpreting the above results is whether compulsory school 
laws should exist at all.  Treating education as an investment, students, whether financially constrained or 
not, forego earnings and endure possible psychological costs to attend school if the expected overall 
future gains from doing so are large enough to offset these costs.  If not, the optimal choice is to leave.  
Compulsory schooling prevents that option.  If students already choose optimally when to leave, then 
imposing a longer stay in school makes them worse off, on average, than before.  21
The results from last section suggest the average gains from schooling, among would-be 
dropouts, are very large.  Some of these gains may be attributable from positive externalities generated 
from increasing a regions’ enrolment and we should not include these gains when considering an 
individual’s dropout decision.  But Table 2 finds increases to school leaving ages for cohorts born a few 
years later did not lead to significant differences in the gains estimated for earlier cohorts.  Even if we 
allow one-third or more of the financial gains to compulsory schooling to come from externalities, Table 
5 shows the remaining amount still substantially exceeds forgone earnings.  Accounting for possible non-
pecuniary benefits from education (such as utility gains from higher life expectancy or lower chances of 
displacement) simply reinforces this conclusion. 
If average gains from an additional year of high school exceed forgone earnings many times over, 
what could explain dropout behavior within an investment model?  I offer four possibilities.  The first is 
that dropouts abhor school.  Poor classroom performance and condescending attitudes from students and 
teachers may make students want to leave as soon as possible, even at the expense of forgoing large 
monetary sums.  Removing reasons for school distaste could go a long way in reducing dropout rates [Lee 
and Burkam (2003)].   The level of distaste among would-be dropouts in the 1990 Eurobarometer Youth 
Survey, however, seems small.  Just over 90 percent of British 15 year-olds expecting to leave school at 
age 16 report being satisfied or very satisfied with their overall lives, compared to 94 percent of British 15 
year-olds expecting to leave later.  For the sample aged 16 and not in school, the fraction reporting life 
satisfaction actually falls to 80 percent, while the fraction for 16 year-olds that did not leave remains at 91 
percent.
21   
A second possibility is that students or parents are financially constrained.  They cannot borrow 
off of higher expected future earnings to prevent low levels of consumption while attending school.  
                                                 
21 The Eurobarometer Surveys are available through UK Data Archive.  They began in 1970 to track opinions and 
attitudes among members of the European Community.  1990 Eurobarometer Youth Survey asks a nationally 
representative sample of 15 to 24 year olds questions about school choice decisions and life satisfaction.  The 
question posed was, “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied 
with the life you lead?”.    22
Students may desire to leave home, or parents may not be able to support their children another year.  If 
financial constraints matter, policies that provide monetary support to youths at risk of dropping out may 
help them stay on to realize larger rewards.  For example, Dearden, et al. (2003) examine a pilot 
experiment in Britain that paid 16 to 18 year-olds from low-income families £30 per week, plus retention 
bonuses, for remaining in school past Grade 11.  Comparing with a randomized control group, the 
program reduced early dropout rates by 5.9 percentage points, from 34.5 percent to 28.7 percent.  This 
result may not necessarily be driven from relaxing credit constraints.  Of those who dropped out, more 
than half were not working.  Similarly, among 17 year-olds not in school in the 2000 U.S. Census, 90.4 
percent lived with parents, and 45 percent were not in the labor force.   
A related third explanation for dropout behavior is that youths want to invest in additional 
education but parents are not willing to bear the costs – not because they are credit constrained but 
because they cannot be sure of recovering those costs.  The argument relates to a recent literature 
explaining the rationale behind child labor law policies in developing countries.  Baland and Robinson 
[2000], for example, point out, “if children could borrow when they were young, they could transfer 
resources to their parents and compensate them for reduced child labor, even if parents subsequently 
planned to leave no bequests.  Alternatively, children could enter into a contract with their parents 
involving a transfer of future income in exchange for a current reduction in child labor.  However, such 
contracts are in general neither self-enforcing nor legally enforceable”.  Institutional arrangements that 
compensate parents for their investment with future resources from children may make all better off.  
A fourth explanation why dropouts choose not to invest in education is that the risks are too high.  
A better depiction of the school-choice decision involves deciding between alternative earnings 
distributions.  If a student is risk-averse, higher expected returns from additional schooling may not be 
enough to offset higher probabilities of earning particularly low wages [Levhari and Weiss, 1974, Chen, 
2002].  Judd (2002) applies the Capital Asset Pricing Model to determine whether the risk-return 
relationship for education is similar to that for comparable assets.  He concludes that the risk associated  23
from an education investment is much lower than the risk associated with other assets with similar 
expected returns.  Furthermore, it seems unlikely a student would end up significantly worse off from 
staying in high school than from dropping out.  More likely, the alternative distribution from staying on 
stochastically dominates.   
 
B. Compulsory School Laws Should Stay 
 
I provide below three additional explanations for dropout behavior.  Unlike the previous ones, 
these imply compulsory school laws may increase welfare, at least on average.   
The first alternative explanation to dropout behavior is that students ignore future consequences 
of present decisions.  A high time preference rate leads students to place more weight on the immediate 
attendance costs of school and less weight on future outcomes such as health and earnings (that cannot be 
transferred to the present).
22  Discounting future consequences from immediate actions does not imply 
myopic behavior unless such discounting occurs temporarily.  Students that temporarily downplay future 
consequences (as considered by Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)) may prefer dropping 
out to staying on but later prefer staying on to dropping out.  For example, when asked whether leaving 
high school was a good decision, 52.9 percent of dropouts from the U.S. High School and Beyond Survey 
said no.
23  Compulsory school laws are often motivated by wanting to prevent these types of responses.     
A second alternative explanation to dropout behavior considers influences from social or cultural 
identity.  A central theme from the works of Akerlof and Kranton (2000,2002), Coleman (1961), Cusick 
(1972), Everhart (1983), Gordon (1957), Hall (1904), Hollingshead (1975), Jackson (1968), Roderick 
                                                 
22 A high time preference rate does not affect dropout behavior without the presence of credit constraints 
or non-pecuniary costs or benefits from schooling.  If none of these cases are present, students that prefer 
to consume more in the present can simply borrow off of future earnings.  [see Oreopoulos, 2003].  
23 The question, “On the whole, do you feel that leaving school was a good decision for you?” was asked to 2,208 
respondents who left high school without graduation in the dropout questionnaire of the third follow-up to the 
sophomore High School and Beyond Survey [ICPSR, 2003].  37.7 percent responded yes, 42.4 percent responded 
no, 19.9 percent did not respond or said ‘Don’t Know’.  24
(1993), and Willis (1977) is that adolescent concerns about self-image or peer acceptance predominate 
adolescent behavior.  Lack of emotional support or acceptance may exacerbate students’ distaste for 
continuing school beyond the minimum age.  Raising the school leaving age would obviously remove this 
distaste, since parents or peers can no longer attribute the higher attainment outcome to a student’s choice.  
A student’s same-aged peers would also face the higher age restrictions, removing any disutility from 
being in school while others are not.  Combining the first and second alternative explanations, students 
may place temporarily high weight on immediate social or cultural considerations, while downplaying 
these factors only after a choice is made. 
A final consideration is that students may simply mispredict.  They may make incorrect present 
value calculations of future returns, or underestimate the real gains from school.  Dominitz and Manski 
(2000) find substantial variation among high school students in earnings expectations conditional on a 
bachelor degree.  While expectations about the returns from a degree were positive, it seems questionable 
whether would-be-dropouts can anticipate lifetime gains from one more year of school.  Guidance from 




This paper uses changes in school leaving laws to measure forgone benefits from dropping out.  I 
compare results across the U.S., Canada, and the U.K.  Changes to these laws in all three countries lead to 
remarkably similar effects.  Students compelled to take an extra year of schooling experienced an average 
increase of 10 to 14 percent in wages.  I also find significant gains from education to health measures, 
employment, and poverty status.  The results hold up against many specifications checks and are entirely 
consistent with previous studies. 
The main conclusion of this paper is that the opportunity cost to dropping out is very large.  My 
estimates range from about 2 to 3 times a dropouts’ peak lifetime annual wage or 6 to 12 times a  25
dropouts’ forgone earnings.  The results offer important perspectives for evaluating school leaving 
decisions.  Knowing what forgone benefits are from dropping out helps quantify a cost-benefit analysis of 
the dropout decision and narrow down possible explanations for leaving.   
In the absence of significant positive externalities, viewing education as an investment suggests 
compulsory schooling laws should not exist, since the laws place constraints on individuals already 
optimizing.  As an investment, the results imply school attendance costs would have to be extremely large 
to explain dropout decisions.  If true, addressing these costs could mitigate dropout behavior. 
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to suggest the possibility that a dropout’s one-year 
attendance costs are not enough to offset this paper’s predicted gains from staying on.  Perhaps other 
explanations would be better suited for explaining dropout behavior.  There is no a priori reason to prefer 
an investment model of school attainment over the many other possibilities – cultural or peer pressures 
may predominate adolescent decision-making; youths may underestimate the rewards from staying in 
school; they may temporarily ignore longer-term consequences of their decisions; or parents may not be 
able to recover costs off of their children’s gains.  Each explanation carries vastly different policy 
implications.  The potential to improve a large set of social and economic outcomes certainly seems to 
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Graphs by state abbreviation
 
Figure 1 
Minimum School Leaving Ages in the U.S. by State 
1915 - 1975  
Figure 2 
Minimum School Leaving Ages in Canada by Province 
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Graphs by provnameFigure 3A 




















Notes: The lower line shows the proportion of British-born adults aged 
16 to 64 from the 1983 to 1998 General Household Surveys who report
leaving full-time education at, or before, age 14.  The upper line shows
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Frac. Left FT School by Age 14 Frac. Left FT School by Age 15Figure 3B 





  Notes: The lower line shows the proportion of Northern Irish adults
aged 16 to 64 from the 1985 to 1998 Continuous Household Surveys
who report leaving full-time education at, or before, age 14.  The upper 
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Adult Education Attainment and Earnings for Cohorts Aged 14 
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Years After Dropout Age Increase...
Years of Schooling (Normalized)
Log Weekly Earnings (Normalized)
Notes:  The U.S. high school dropout data extract discussed in Section III was aggregated 
into state and birth cohort cell means, weighted by population size.  Average total years of 
schooling and log weekly earnings were regressed on indicators for the number of years 
between an increase in a state’s minimum school leaving age and the year a cohort was 14, 
plus state and birth cohort fixed effects.  The time indicator coefficients are shown,





Adult Education Attainment and Earnings for Cohorts Aged 14 
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Years After Dropout Age Increase...
Grade Completed (Normalized)
Log Annual Earnings (Normalized)
Notes:  The Canadian high school dropout data extract discussed in Section III was aggregated 
into province and birth cohort cell means, weighted by population size.  Average high school 
grade attainment and log annual earnings were regressed on indicators for the number of years 
between an increase in a province’s minimum school leaving age and the year a cohort was 14, 
plus province and birth cohort fixed effects.  The time indicator coefficients are shown,





Adult Education Attainment and Earnings for Cohorts Aged 14 






































-14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Years After Dropout Age Increase...
Years of School (Normalized)
 Log Annual Earnings (Normalized
Notes:  The U.K. high school dropout data extract discussed in Section III was aggregated into 
region (Britain/N.Ireland) and birth cohort cell means, weighted by population size.  Cell means 
were calculated using the sample of 25 to 64 year-olds who were age 14 between 1935 and 1985.
Average high school grade attainment and log annual earnings were regressed on indicators for the 
number of years between an increase in a region’s minimum school leaving age and the year a 
cohort was 14, plus region and birth cohort fixed effects.  The time indicator coefficients are
shown, normalized to zero for the group that was 14 years-old 12 years before an increase. Figure 5 
Projected Annual Earnings Profiles for Males Leaving School at Ages 15 and 16 
(2000 U.S. Dollars) 
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16 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 64
age
Left at 15 Left at 16
Notes: Each figure uses quartic age coefficients, returns to compulsory schooling estimates, and a baseline wage of $7,525 for 15-year old dropouts at age 15 (the average wage 
among 17 year old male dropouts working full-time in the 2000 U.S. Census) to generate the profiles.  For the U.S. and Canada, the coefficients were generated using the same 
results in Table 3 for male high school dropouts, except that the regression samples included dropouts aged 15 to 64 not in school instead of dropouts age 25 to 64.  For the U.K.,
the sample included all 15 to 64 year-old males in the 1983 to 1998 GHHS that left full-time school before age 18.  Log annual earnings were regressed on years of schooling, 
instrumented by the minimum leaving age faced when in school, a quartic in age, and fixed effects for survey year, and whether living in Northern Ireland.  the manufacturing 
sector, female, and average age.  Data were grouped into means by birth year, Northern Ireland, sex, and survey year and weighted by cell population size.  See text for more 
details. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample with Sample with Sample with Sample with
Full Sample < High School > High School Full Sample < High School > High School
Dependent Variable
School Leaving Age = 14 0.236 0.253 -0.014 0.033 0.027 -0.013
[0.0316]*** [0.0370]*** [0.0175] [0.0076]*** [0.0090]*** [0.0113]
School Leaving Age = 15 0.260 0.168 -0.023 0.054 0.022 -0.005
[0.0314]*** [0.0465]*** [0.0160] [0.0076]*** [0.0104]** [0.0104]
School Leaving Age = 16 0.458 0.451 -0.003 0.060 0.045 -0.007
[0.0369]*** [0.0428]*** [0.0188] [0.0085]*** [0.0109]*** [0.0121]
Initial Sample Size 2,814,203 727,789 1,173,880
F-Test: Coefficients on laws are zero 87.8 51.8 2.3
Dependent Variable
School Leaving Age = 14 0.405 0.345 0.033 0.037 0.044 -0.012
[0.0425]*** [0.0616]*** [0.0189]* [0.0059]*** [0.0126]*** [0.0100]
School Leaving Age >= 15 0.643 0.657 -0.004 0.054 0.086 -0.007
[0.0544]*** [0.0730]*** [0.0178] [0.0065]*** [0.0126]*** [0.0115]
Initial Sample Size 8,208,030 4,177,800 4,030,230
F-Test: Coefficients on laws are zero 70.2 42.5 4.6
Dependent Variable
School Leaving Age = 15 0.425 0.487 0.062 0.058 0.052 0.005
[0.0313]*** [0.0309]*** [0.0785] [0.0198]*** [0.0242]** [0.0369]
Initial Sample Size 66,185 47,584 13,760
F-Test: Coefficients on laws are zero 184.9 358.5 0.6
Table 1
First Stage Effects of Compulsory Schooling on Education Attainment and Earnings
for the U.S., Canada, and the U.K.
Reduced Form Coefficients on  Earnings 1st Stage Effects of Dropout Ages on Schooling
Age Left Full-Time Education Log Annual Wage
United States    [1901 - 61 Birth Cohorts aged 25-64 in the 1950 - 2000 Censuses]
Canada    [1911 - 61 Birth Cohorts aged 25-64 in the 1971 - 2001 Censuses]
United Kingdom    [1921 - 51 Birth Cohorts aged 32-64 in the 1983 - 98 GHHS]
Number of Years of Schooling Log Weekly Wage
Highest Grade Attended Log Annual Wage
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for birth year, region (state, province, Britain/N.Ireland), survey year, sex, and a quartic in age. The U.S. results also include a dummy variable for
race and state controls for fraction living in urban areas, fraction black, in the labor force, in the manufacturingsector, female, and average age based on when a birth cohort was age 14. Similar
province controls for Canada include fraction in urban areas, fraction in the manufacturing sector, female, and average age. Data are grouped into means by birth year, nation, sex, race (for the
U.S.) and survey year and weighted by cell population size. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by region and birth cohort. Single, double, and triple asterix indicate
significant coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively. The ommited variable indicates whether able to drop out at age 13 or less for the U.S. and Canada, and 14
or less for the U.K.  Samples include all adults aged 25 to 64.  Dependent variable in Column 3 for Canada is 1 = some post secondary schooling, 0 otherwise.  See text for more data specifics.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lead Year for
School Leaving Age
Faced by Later Birth School Leaving Later School School Leaving Later School Years of Later School
Cohort Age Leaving Age Age Leaving Age Schooling Leaving Age
none 0.099 0.015 0.151
[0.0067]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0130]***
2 years 0.114 -0.016 0.016 -0.001 0.141 0.001
[0.0099]*** [0.0077]** [0.0021]*** [0.0015] [0.0147]*** [0.0011]
3 years 0.103 -0.005 0.014 0.001 0.139 0.001
[0.0088]*** [0.0072] [0.0019]*** [0.0014] [0.0160]*** [0.0013]
Lead Year for
School Leaving Age
Faced by Later Birth School Leaving Future School School Leaving Future School Highest Grade Future School
Cohort Age Leaving Age Age Leaving Age Attended Leaving Age
none 0.374 0.051 0.135
[0.0489]*** [0.0092]*** [0.0181]***
2 years 0.355 0.034 0.044 0.012 0.124 0.007
[0.0601]*** [0.0563] [0.0098]*** [0.0107] [0.0187]*** [0.0071]
3 years 0.358 0.037 0.042 0.019 0.118 0.014
[0.0554]*** [0.0535] [0.0094]*** [0.0111]* [0.0175]*** [0.0074]*
Lead Year for
School Leaving Age
Faced by Later Birth School Leaving Future School School Leaving Future School Highest Grade Future School
Cohort Age Leaving Age Age Leaving Age Attended Leaving Age
none 0.425 0.058 0.158
[0.0313]*** [0.0198]*** [0.0491]***
2 years 0.484 -0.100 0.072 -0.023 0.176 -0.011
[0.0380]*** [0.0393]** [0.0233]*** [0.0257] [0.0577]*** [0.0233]
3 years 0.477 -0.119 0.073 -0.032 0.179 -0.017
[0.0318]*** [0.0342]*** [0.0192]*** [0.0223] [0.0463]*** [0.0202]
Highest Grade Attended Log Annual Earnings Returns to Comp. Schooling
United Kingdom    [1921 - 51 Birth Cohorts aged 32-64 in the 1983 - 98 GHHS]
First Stage Dep. Var. Reduced form Dep. Var. IV: Estimates of
Table 2
Estimated Effects of Own School Leaving Age and Later Birth Cohorts'
School Leave Age on Education Attainment and Earnings
First Stage Dep. Var. Reduced form Dep. Var. IV: Estimates of
United States    [1901 - 61 Birth Cohorts aged 25-64 in the 1950 - 2000 Censuses]
Highest Grade Attended Returns to Comp. Schooling Log Annual Earnings
Returns to Comp. Schooling Years of Schooling Log Weekly Earnings
Canada    [1911 - 61 Birth Cohorts aged 25-64 in the 1971 - 2001 Censuses]
First Stage Dep. Var. Reduced form Dep. Var. IV: Estimates of
Notes: Each row in columns 1 and 2 show the first stage coefficients from regressing own school leaving age and a later cohort's school leaving age on
education attainment. Columns 3 and 4 show the reduced form coefficients from regressing own school leaving age and a later cohort's school leaving age
on earnings. Columns 5 and 6 show the coefficients from the instrumental variables estimate of the returns to compulsory schooling and the lead school
leaving age control. All regressions include fixed effects for birth year, region (state or province), survey year, sex, and a quartic in age. The U.S. results
also include a dummy variable for race and state controls for fraction of state living in urban areas, fraction black, in the labor force, in the manufacturing
sector, female, and average age based on when a birth cohort was age 14. Similar province controls for Canada include fraction in urban areas, fraction in
the manufacturing sector, female, and average age. Data are grouped into means by birth year, region sex, race (for the U.S.), and survey year and
weighted by population size. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by region and birth cohort. Single, double, and triple asterix
indicate significant coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.  See text for more data specifics.(1) (2) (3)
OLS IV IV
<HS Sample Full Samp. <HS Sample
United States [1901-61 Birth Cohorts aged 25-64
Dependent Variable in the 1950 - 2000 Censuses]
Log Weekly Earnings (all workers) 0.079 0.133 0.095
[0.0005]*** [0.0118]*** [0.0224]***
Log Weekly Earnings (males) 0.070 0.122 0.157
[0.0004]*** [0.0141]*** [0.0252]***
Log Weekly Earnings (black males) 0.074 0.158 0.140
[0.0004]*** [0.0132]*** [0.0207]***
Canada [1911-61 Birth Cohorts aged 25-64
in the 1971-2001 Censuses]
Log Annual Earnings (all workers) 0.088 0.084 0.132
[0.0008]*** [0.0103]*** [0.0145]***
Log Annual Earnings (males) 0.107 0.106 0.138
[0.0010]*** [0.0121]*** [0.0152]***
United Kingdom [1921-51 Birth Cohorts aged 32-64
in the 1983 - 1998 GHHS]
Log Annual Earnings (all workers) 0.147 0.158 0.074
[0.0058]*** [0.0491]*** [0.0420]*
Log Annual Earnings (males) 0.134 0.094 0.073
[0.0071]*** [0.0568] [0.0516]
Table 3
OLS and IV Estimates of the Returns to Compulsory Schooling
for the U.S., Canada, and the U.K.
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for birth year, region (state, province, Britain/N.Ireland), survey year, sex (for the full
sample only), and a quartic in age. The U.S. results also include a dummy variable for race (except for the regression for black
males) and state controls for fraction of state living in urban areas, fraction black, in the labor force, in the manufacturing sector,
female, and average age based on when a birth cohort was age 14. Similar province controls for Canada include fraction in urban
areas, fraction in the manufacturing sector, female, and average age. Data are grouped into means by birth year, nation, sex, race
(for the U.S.) and survey year. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by region and birth cohort. Single, double,
and triple asterix indicate significant coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively. See text for more
data specifics.(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean OLS IV IV
<HS Sample <HS Sample Full Sample <HS Sample
Country (Schooling Variable)
United States (Total Years of Schooing)
Physical or mental health  0.092 -0.014 -0.025 -0.029
disability that limits personal care [0.0003]*** [0.0058]*** [0.0126]**
Disability that limits mobility 0.128 -0.020 -0.043 -0.031
[0.0004]*** [0.0070]*** [0.0191]
United Kingdom (Age Left Full Time Education)
Self Reported Poor Health 0.150 -0.037 -0.032 -0.019
[0.0016]*** [0.0113]*** [0.0085]**
Self Reported Good Health 0.564 0.065 0.060 0.025
[0.0021]*** [0.0155]*** [0.0115]**
United States (Schooling Variable: Total Years of Schooing)
Unemployed 0.064 -0.004 -0.005 -0.026
[0.0002]*** [0.0040] [0.0103]**
Receiving welfare 0.067 -0.013 -0.011 -0.020
[0.0002]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0068]***
Below poverty line 0.220 -0.023 -0.064 -0.085
[0.0002]*** [0.0085]*** [0.0151]***
Canada (Highest Grade Attended)
Unemployed; looking for work 0.062 -0.009 -0.010 -0.013
[0.0004]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]***
Below low-income cut-off 0.227 -0.038 -0.026 -0.019
[0.0004]*** [0.0038]*** [0.0068]***
United Kingdom (Age Left Full Time Education)
In labor force; looking for work 0.110 -0.030 -0.032 -0.020
[0.0044]*** [0.0150]** [0.0166]
Receiving income support 0.066 -0.025 -0.059 -0.031
[0.0024]*** [0.0259]** [0.0150]**
Health Outcomes (ages 25 - 84)
Other Social-Economic Outcomes (ages 25 - 64)
Table 4
OLS and IV Estimates for Effects of Compulsory Schooling on Health
and Other Social-Economic Outcomes
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for birth year, region (state, province, Britain/N.Ireland), survey year, sex, and a quartic in age. The U.S. results also
include a dummy variable for race and state controls for fraction of state living in urban areas, fraction black, in the labor force, in the manufacturing sector,
female, and average age based on when a birth cohort was age 14. Similar province controls for Canada include fraction in urban areas, fraction in the
manufacturing sector, female, and average age. Data are grouped into means by birth year,nation, sex, race (for the U.S.) and surveyyear. Huber-Whitestandard
errors are shown from clustering by region and birth cohort. Single, double, and triple asterix indicate significant coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1
percent levels respectively.  See text for more data specifics.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Peak Income
Discount Rate Forgone Earnings for Early Dropout
0.154 0.11 0.07 (at Age 54)
0.03 103,593 72,485 45,200 7,525 34,243
0.05 68,472 47,911 29,876 7,525 34,243
0.07 48,236 33,751 21,046 7,525 34,243
0.295 7,525
0.129 0.11 0.07 (at Age 47)
0.03 82,572 69,616 43,411 7,525 30,827
0.05 55,029 46,395 28,931 7,525 30,827
0.07 38,972 32,857 20,489 7,525 30,827
0.252 7,525
0.137 0.11 0.07 (at Age 52)
0.03 120,354 95,035 59,261 7,525 43,490
0.05 79,513 62,785 39,151 7,525 43,490
0.07 55,785 44,050 27,468 7,525 43,490
0.308 7,525
* estimated annual return
Table 5
Average Financial Gain from Dropping Out One Year Later,





Notes: Projected wage profiles among 15 and 16 year-old dropouts between the ages of 16 and 64 are shown in Figure 5.
Column 1 shows the estimated annual returns to compulsory schooling from the instrumental variable regressions used to
create these profiles. Column 1 also converts the annual profile differences to present value at age 15. Columns 2 and 3
show present value gains assuming alternative annual returns to compulsory schooling (.11 and .07 rspectively). The
baseline wage for a 15 year old dropout at age 15 is $7,525. The fourth row for each country shows the discount factor
needed to generate present value gains equal to this amount. Column 5 displys the projected peak earnings for a 15-year-
old dropout.